Seven what? …and you’re back to quality
Quantities have no value without quality.

It’s an honest question, seeing as I’m probably doing the same right now. Equating vertical social control with Grid, and horisontal social control with Group.

What criteria should we follow to determine if it’s ok to overlay two fourfold models? Obviously, they should match in ideology somehow. Had I reversed it, and said that horisontal social control is like Grid, then it would have made no sense.

As for Heidegger’s model, if it works as a twofold model, there’s no point in making it into a fourfold model. Ockham’s Razor.

I noticed this myself down here in Kenya, when studying witchcraft. On a two-fold model, both ends of the axis were both “empty” at the same time.

You can compare it with Claude Levi-Strauss binary oppositions, where each pair of oppositions form a unity to which there is another opposition.

There is a need for a second axis, to accurately describe how people perceive the world. If people are neither libertarians nor communitarians, which is the opposition to these two? Because, in a four-fold view, you have four oppositions, not two.

On 2: It’s pretty clear that mainstream political science, e.g., does *not* take culture theory very seriously. This is about 30% fault of mainstream, in my view, and about 70% the fault of CT writers for failing to make sufficient effort to connect to mainstream conversations by showing those involved what CT can add. Exception would be Perri 6, who does great work on institutional dynamics & is also very thoughtful about methods & mechanisms, & Hank Jenkins-Smith, who is following through on Wildavsky’s idea that GG explains formation of policy preferences.

In the study of risk perception, I think CT ideas & concepts are reasonably prominent. But this is so only for work using reliable & valid forms of empirical methods to test CT. There is a lot of writing on risk issues that uses CT for idiosyncratic & ad hoc story telling. Ones that purport to see worldviews in “institutions” rather than people, in particular, tend not to get much attention b/c of the ill-specified & mysterious account of mechanisms. Douglas & Wildavsky were aware of and fought to overcome resistance to functionalist theorizing; their descendants just ignore this matter & so are ignored.

On 3: my answer reflects response to 2. Works that classify organizations using GG tend to be very impressionistic, undisciplined, indeed, insusceptible of testing. There *are* actually lots of interesting, methodologically & conceptually coherent analyses that assess relationship between group ideology & structure of on-line activities. See, e.g., Shaw, A. & Benkler, Y. A Tale of Two Blogospheres. American Behavioral Scientist 56, 459-487 (2012). (Perri 6 also has a very good book on “e-governance”: 6, P. E-governance : styles of political judgement in the information age polity, (Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hawpshire; New York, 2004)). Group-grid might make nice contribution here but only if researchers develop reliable & valid criteria for classification & explain what GG so conceived can do that alternatives can’t (something that researchers using empirical methods to apply CT to risk perceptions *have* been mindful to do).

2. Generally unknown; viewed with skepticism generally

3. Sure, but not by criteria that are reliable & valid (i.e., ones that others could apply consistently & that admit of measurement suitable for testing hypotheses)

Answers 2 & 3 are very much related

Just saying people gamble because they are a type of person doesnt really answer the question. Its functionalism. We might aswell do it the other way around. We see certain people as a type of person because they gamble.

We need something more, to prove the causality in this correlation. If its true