Does ‘belief’ matter? A Coda

What is the relationship between belief and rule-keeping? Which matters more in religion? These comments follow from a previous post on this matter.

The Guardian’s Face to Faith column has an interesting comment by Geoffrey Alderman on the life of Benzion Dunner, a prominent member of London’s Orthodox Jewish community, who died earlier this year.

Chief Rabbi Sir Jonathan Sacks said: “Benzion Dunner was an outstanding exemplar of Jewish values and Jewish responsibility. He was a person of exceptional chesed, much of whose work was done quietly behind the scenes and was all the more impressive for that. Our hearts go out to the members of his family, whose grief we share. His memory will endure as a source of blessing and inspiration.”

According to the Guardian article (and that’s my main source), while Dunner was very wealthy and very charitable, he was also a user of cocaine and may have died under the influence.

The question is how the community of which he was a part should respond to this. Alderman seems to think it’s sad “that practically no one among the sectarian-orthodox is prepared to condemn his behaviour”.

The issue seems to be how someone who doesn’t keep the rules is to be regarded. Is condemnation appropriate?

It seems there is more to it than merely belief or obedience. There is also belonging. This matters enormously. And in the case of Benzion Dunner, his standing in his community, not his rule-keeping, is what he is being remembered for. And this standing comes from exemplary chesed, not from perfection.

No one can be good at everything; all of us have our weak points. In this case, it seems, fatal drug-taking.

But belonging, as much as believing or obeying, may be the mark of a good, if flawed, life.

Magic needs rules

Magic requires rules. Here is what anthropologist Marcel Mauss has to say:

‘Far from being the simple expression of individual emotions, magic takes every opportunity to coerce actions and locutions. Everything is fixed and becomes precisely determined. Rules and patterns are imposed. Magical formulas are muttered or sung on one note to special rhythms …Gestures are regulated with an equally fine precision. The magician does everything in a rhythmical fashion as in dancing: and ritual rules tell him which hand or finger he should use, which foot he should step forward with. When he sits, stands up, lies down, jumps, shouts, walks in any direction, it is because it is all prescribed. Even when he is alone he is not freer than the priest at his altar… Moreover, words are pronounced or actions are performed facing a certain direction, the most common rule being that the magician should face the direction of the person at whom the rite is aimed.’

Marcel Mauss, General Theory of Magic [1950] tr. Robert Brain, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972, p.58. Quoted in Ian Hunt 2002, ‘Escape Routine’ accessed at http://www.simonpattersonart.com/essays/essays_escape.html

Calling all Unthinking Anglicans!

The Thinking Anglicans website, http://www.thinkinganglicans.org.uk, is worth a look. Curiously I have been unable to locate its sister website, unthinkinganglicans.org.uk and wonder if there might be any takers out there. While the dnsserver claims: ‘the domain name does not exist’, I am tempted to ask whether this statement is epistemologically defensible.

How important is ‘belief’? Three questions and a tentative answer

A while back Rabbi Jonathan Romain wrote thoughtfully on some Jewish approaches to the existence or non-existence of God.

The heading of this article is ‘Jews don’t have to believe – if they do what he says’. And clearly this needs a little unpacking.

It may make a certain sort of sense to ‘do what he says’ if you believe in the kind of God who expects obedience. But what if you don’t? If there is no ‘he’ what is the justification for keeping his law? Three questions arise in particular.

First, It’s fairly obvious that if you insist on obeying the commandments of a deity whose existence you deny, and have no considered reasons for doing so, you are in an untenable position in the long-term. So could there be good and sustainable reasons for this behaviour?

Second, there is an aporia in Romain’s piece – a question going begging. At the start he writes as though a decline in synagogue attendance is some kind of problem to be lamented and he identifies Jewish atheism or agnosticism as the culprit.

‘No wonder they do not come back to pray to a God they reckon is absent.’

But by the end, he seems to be excusing the non-attenders on the grounds that Judaism isn’t consensually about belief in any case. The lingering question, then, is whether it matters that synagogues are reportedly emptying. And if it does, would a return to dogmatic belief be any kind of solution, or just promote further alienation?

Third (or eighth and ninth if you’re actually counting), the tradition itself does seem to have an ongoing debate about the significance of attitudes to rules, which Romain seems to skip over rather lightly. This was why the Christian Reformers critiqued what they saw as the ‘legalism’ of the Roman Catholic Church. As they read the Bible for themselves, especially the Prophets, they became exposed to a strand of religious thought that prioritised disposition over practice, epitomised by the rather ungainly but significant metaphor of the law written in the heart. This debate continues into the present. Is it enough merely to keep the letter of the law? Don’t you also need at least a little respect for its spirit?

One partial resolution of these questions might be to see religious observance as a kind of game to be played.

Like any game it’s more fun if you have a set of rules, and almost impossible to continue if you don’t. It’s interesting that almost no one claims a supernatural being invented the rules of games, and yet game-playing is massively and enduringly popular. Conversely, the experience of being coerced into playing a rule-based game, as in a million school sports lessons in the rain, is usually very negative; it’s only when we freely consent to the rules, without authoritarianism, that the game becomes enjoyable. As anyone who has played games will tell you, the rules look fixed but really they’re contestable, and the evolving debate about the rules is a significant part of what makes the game socially worthwhile. Finally, and perhaps more than anything else, it’s a social thing: if you won’t play along, you’re missing out on all the fun.

Perhaps if synagogues and churches were more like that – more ludic in their disposition – they’d have more punters.

In case it is supposed that the analogy between religious practice and a game is frivolous, it should be remembered that games, as well as religious practice, can be very serious things.

The forthcoming TV drama God on Trial gives an example of a seriously playful approach to the problem of evil.

Objectors might argue that a really significant difference between a religion and a game has been overlooked: the difference being the divinity itself. After all, who ever heard of people getting together to behave as though fictional beings really existed? Actually, this is the main premise of fantasy role-playing games. These have taken the Internet and what used to be called ‘the younger generation’ by storm and may well point towards a viable future for religious practice. A concern would be that these ‘massively multiplayer games’ seem to encourage, to put it mildly, a certain lack of ethical seriousness. But hasn’t this always been the dilemma of religionists in an ethically frivolous world? And in any case, with a few notable exceptions this concern probably mistakes form for substance. Beneath the pixie dust and hidden deep in the alien bases lies a far-reaching ongoing experiment in character formation (a phrase the fans of Ignatius Loyola and Gary Gygax would be equally comfortable with). Far from denigrating ethics, games and their rules can actually establish an environment in which ethical behaviour is modelled, learned, and even mastered. In realising this aspiration the games known as religions can and should play an important part.

Truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth (at least in Swedish schools)

The Gaol Chapel at Lincoln Castle
The Gaol Chapel at Lincoln Castle http://www.flickr.com/photos/theholyllama/

According to the Guardian newspaper Sweden is going to ban the teaching of religious doctrine ‘as though it were true’. It may well be a move to try to crack down on Islamic schools, about which Swedes seem either worried or paranoid, depending on your viewpoint.

Could they not try teaching the critical skills necessary to judge for oneself whether something is likely to be true?

Religious schools don’t indoctrinate children by giving them a diet of facts, true or untrue. They do it by creating a community of faith and learning to which students become emotionally attached. In a sense, then, it doesn’t matter what is taught overtly, the mere existence of a network of relationships is enough for a religious school to impact strongly on its students and their families.

One way of making this relational influence difficult was tried in the Nineteenth Century in Lincoln Castle Gaol in England. The chapel was designed so each prisoner would be able to see the preacher, but be completely unaware of the existence of their neighbouring prisoners. That way they would have the good influence of religion without the negative influence of other criminals.

Would we be better off without religion?

I’m planning to attend a public debate on religion, organised by Intelligence Squared. The motion is ‘We’d be better off without religion’, and the speakers include Victor Stenger, who wrote God, the Failed Hypothesis – How Science Shows that God does not Exist. I checked this out recently.

The blurb about Professor Stenger says:

Stenger maintains that plausible natural explanations exist for for all observable phenomena and there is strong scientific evidence against anything mystical or supernatural in the universe.

The book claims:

Not only does the universe show no evidence for God, it looks exactly as it would be expected to look if there is no God.

I would frame this slightly differently and suggest that the evidence in favour of the existence of God is exactly the same as the evidence against the existence of God. It may seem like a small difference but I think it’s important. Here’s why. Continue reading Would we be better off without religion?

Here Comes the Sun King

I’m interested right now in Jaime Laura’s latest book, Christian Texts for Aztecs. This is the second of two works exploring the ways in which Christian missionaries in the Americas adapted their message for an Aztec audience, and were themselves in turn somewhat adapted by that environment. An image that is particularly striking is that of the ‘sunburst’ monstrance, an artefact with which anyone who has attended much Catholic worship will be familiar.

Before the Christian encounter with Aztec culture
Before the Christian encounter with Aztec culture (Source)
After the encounter with the New World
After the encounter with the New World (Source)

The gold came from Mexico, but did the design too? The question is, to what extent was the design of such artefacts influenced by existing depictions of Aztec deities surrounded by a sunburst motif? And to what extent does the solar design represent an innovation, accentuating a theme – Christ as “Sun of righteousness” – that was already present in Christian theology, but rendered more prominent by implicit comparison with Aztec sun gods?

Did this kind of Aztec design influence the missionaries? (Source)
Did this kind of Aztec design influence the missionaries? (Source)

It’s not (all) about God – Part 1

Why is it that when you glance over at organised religion you find yourself in the middle of an argument? Take the Anglicans at their Lambeth Bishops’ conference. Isn’t it a bit confusing to be led to think Christians are in it for the chance to meet God in person, only to discover the leadership is completely preoccupied with organising who’s having sex with whom? They’ll say it’s a serious concern for God’s intentions for human relationships, about right and wrong. But if God’s so bothered, why doesn’t someone cut to the chase and ask him what he thinks? Now it seems these bishops have been asking and have  received a very clear message from God which they can now reveal to the world.

The only problem is, the clear message conflicts with itself, depending on exactly which Bishop was listening carefully. Back in the real world, we would just draw an analogy here with democracy, and get on with it. But the bishops, it seems, just can’t get on with each other any more. One side, in refusing to take disgust seriously, is breaking with a venerable tradition of finding certain things abominable and having nothing to do with them. The other side, in taking disgust very seriously, can’t make any distinction between ethics (good or bad) and mores (usual or unusual), except when it comes to rock badgers (look them up). One side is threatening to boycott the conference and perhaps even split the church. The other side is threatening to let it happen.

The Bible clearly says rock badgers are not to be eaten

If the church does split there will probably have to be a new name. ‘Anglicans who aren’t gay and don’t even like gays’ may not have been taken, and may be apposite, especially given its connotation of repressed homophilia. But no doubt we’ll have to put up with some self-serving nonsense like Confessing Anglicans, Real Anglicans or True Anglicans. The other lot will probably carry on being plain old Anglicans, except where they’re plain old Episcopalians (the distinctions here are probably enough to start another argument, so let’s not ask).

Clearly it doesn’t have much to do with God – unless God’s perfections stretch to perfect pedantry.

When these kinds of arguments take place it makes it very clear that the church is not primarily about religion, as claimed and as commonly understood, but about whether homosexuals, women and other ‘minorities’ should be discriminated  against. In other words, the church is an arena for the continuation of debates that should have ended a long time ago, and elsewhere have.

So will the arguing be good for Truth with a capital T?

Why shouldn’t the Pope wear Prada?

Is there a sense in the Vatican’s reply to the rumours about the Pope’s clothing choice that he shouldn’t be wearing designer accessories? Why not? It is restated that he’s a ‘simple and sober’ man, when in point of fact he isn’t: he’s the Pope. A simple man wouldn’t wear all the outfits that popes traditionally wear, Prada or no Prada.//www.flickr.com/photos/miqul/\">miqul</a> The reason for the disclaimer is that the Catholic Church is the quintessential Hierarchical organisation, and as such the leadership must be seen to be institutionally splendid while also personally unremarkable. Opulent vestments are permissible but signs of individual ostentation, or indeed, individuality, are slightly distasteful and  off-message. This is in stark contrast to the way the mass media treats the Pope. With its Individualist orientation, the media obviously sees the Pope as a celebrity, and his shoes and shades are to be celebrated as making him more uniquely him. Anything the Pope does to subvert the uniform is great, and newsworthy – at least to Esquire Magazine, which made him ‘accessorizer of the year‘ (‘have a signature… make it your own’).

This seems a fine line to tread. The trick seems to be to act like a star while denying you’re one, and hope we won’t notice the incongruity. How’s he doing?

Can atheism make a new type of religion possible?

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur wrote:

Paul Ricoeur [US Library of Congress]

‘Atheism is not limited in meaning to the mere negation and destruction of religion, but …rather, it opens up the horizon for something else, for a type of faith that might be called …a postreligious faith or a faith for a postreligious age. …it looks back toward what it denies and forward toward what it makes possible.’ (Ricoeur, P. 1974 The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 440).

It is interesting to see what kind of opening up the populist atheism of writers such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchins is leading to.